# Парадоксът на Скулем и квантовата информация. Относителност на пълнота по Гьодел

*Philosophical Alternatives*20 (2):131-147 (2011)

**Abstract**

In 1922, Thoralf Skolem introduced the term of «relativity» as to infinity от set theory. Не demonstrated Ьу Zermelo 's axiomatics of set theory (incl. the axiom of choice) that there exists unintended interpretations of anу infinite set. Тhus, the notion of set was also «relative». We сan apply
his argurnentation to Gödel's incompleteness theorems (1931) as well as to his completeness theorem (1930). Then, both the incompleteness of Реапо arithmetic and the completeness of first-order logic tum out to bе also «relative» in Skolem 's sense. Skolem 's «relativity» argumentation of that kind сan bе applied to а vету wide range of problems and one сan spoke of the relativity of discreteness and continuity or, of finiiteness and infinity, or, of Cantor 's kinds of infinities, etc. The relativity of Skolemian type helps us for generaIizing Einstein 's principle of relativity from the invariance of the physical laws toward diffeomorphisms to their invariance toward anу morphisms (including and especiaIly the discrete ones). Such а kind of generalization from diffeomorphisms (then, the notion of velocity always makes sense) to anу kind of morphism (when 'velocity' mау оr maу not make sense) is an extension of the general Skolemian type оГ relativity between discreteness and continuity от between finiteness and infinity. Particularly, the Lorentz invariance is not valid in general because the notion of velocity is limited to diffeomorphisms. [п the case of entanglement, the physical interaction is discrete0. 'Velocity" and consequently, the 'Lorentz invariance'"do not make sense. Тhat is the simplest explanation ofthe argurnent EPR, which tums into а paradox оnJу if the universal validity of 'velocity' and 'Lогелtz invariance' is implicitly accepted.

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